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     1. Introduction 
According to the life cycle-permanent income hypothesis, an individual’s consumption 
depends on her expectations concerning her permanent income rather than on her current income, 
and thus changes in the individual’s consumption from one period to the next should not depend 
on changes in her current income.  However, many empirical studies find that changes in an 
individual’s current income do have a significant impact on changes in her consumption, contrary 
to the life cycle-permanent hypothesis, and thus the validity of this hypothesis is now in doubt.   
One of the most important assumptions of the life cycle-permanent income hypothesis is 
the assumption of perfect capital markets--that is, that individuals can borrow freely at the current 
interest rate.  When capital markets are imperfect (for example, when the borrowing rate is 
higher than the deposit rate or when the credit limit of individuals is low), individuals will not be 
able to borrow freely, and changes in an individual’s current income may have a significant 
impact on changes in her consumption.  Thus, whether capital markets are perfect or imperfect 
drastically alters theoretical predictions concerning individuals’ consumption behavior, and it is 
very important to determine whether or not the assumption of perfect capital markets is valid. 
In this paper, we examine what characteristics borrowing-constrained households have 
and whether borrowing constraints have an important influence on household consumption 
behavior using Japanese micro data from the 1994 “Public Opinion Survey on Household Savings 
and Consumption (POSSC) (in Japanese, Chochiku to Shouhi ni kansuru Yoron Chousa)” which 
was conducted by the Central Council for Savings Information (currently called the Central 
Council for Financial Services Information).  We identify borrowing constrained households 
using three indicators, some of which are unique to our data source. 
The contributions of this paper are as follows: first, some of the indicators we use in our 
analysis to identify borrowing-constrained households are unique.  Previous studies identify 
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borrowing-constrained households according to whether or not households possess credit cards 
(Shintani (1994) and Jappelli et al. (1998)) or whether or not households’ non-housing wealth is 
less than two months’ worth of income (Zeldes (1989) and Kohara and Horioka (1998, 2001)).  
We use these same indicators but we also use information on whether or not households have 
complaints about the loan screening procedures of financial institutions to identify 
borrowing-constrained households.  In particular, we define borrowing-constrained households 
as households that want financial institutions to expand their low-interest personal loans and 
households that want financial institutions to show flexibility when screening loan applications 
and to take account of applicants’ credentials and projects even though their collateral is limited.  
The former are likely to have abandoned their plans to borrow because the interest rate was too 
high, and the latter are likely to have had their loan applications turned down due to the lack of 
collateral, and thus both types of households are likely to be borrowing-constrained.  The 
inclusion of a question about the reasons for consumer dissatisfaction with the loan screening 
procedures of financial institutions in household surveys is unique, and our use of this question to 
identify borrowing constrained households is also unique.  
Second, the data source we use in our analysis contains various information on loans--for 
example, new loans per year (flow data), loan repayments per year (flow data), and the total 
amount of outstanding loans (stock data).  In particular, information is available on outstanding 
loans from each type of borrower--not only from financial institutions but also from money lender 
companies (consumer credit companies (in Japanese, sarakin) and pawnshops), one’s employer, 
and relatives and acquaintances.  Thus, the data source we use in our analysis is well-suited for 
an analysis of borrowing constraints. . 
To preview our main findings, our results show that the characteristics of 
borrowing-constrained households differ greatly depending on which indicator we use and that 
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whether or not households have complaints about the loan screening procedures of financial 
institutions and whether or not households’ non-housing wealth is less than two months’ worth of 
income appear to be far better indicators than whether or not households are using credit cards.  
We also find that changes in the current income of households that are likely to be 
borrowing-constrained have a positive and significant impact on changes in their consumption in 
almost all cases, whereas changes in the income of households that are unlikely to be 
borrowing-constrained do not have a significant impact on changes in their consumption in any 
case.  These results suggest that borrowing constraints have an important influence on household 
consumption behavior and that the presence of borrowing constraints is one explanation for why 
the life cycle-permanent income hypothesis does not hold in the real world. 
This paper is organized as follows:  In Section 2, we conduct a theoretical analysis of 
borrowing constraints and their impact on consumption behavior and survey previous studies, in 
Section 3, we describe the data source and variable definitions, in Section 4, we present some 
descriptive statistics and cross tabulations, in Section 5, we describe the estimation model and 
estimation method, in Section 6, we present our estimation results, and Section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Theoretical Considerations and Previous Research  
2.1 Theoretical Considerations 
In this subsection, we conduct a theoretical analysis of borrowing constraints and show 
why an individual’s consumption behavior will differ depending on whether or not she is 
borrowing-constrained using a two-period model (this exposition is based on Ogawa and Horioka 
(1996)).1 
                                                  
1 In this theoretical model, we assume for the sake of simplicity that the individual will borrow only when 
she has no saving.  This is an extreme assumption, and as a matter of fact, the proportion of individuals 
who have some loans but no savings is only 4.88% (206 out of 4225 observations). 
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Look at Figure 1.  Ct is the income of the individual at time t (t=1, 2), yt is the income of 
the individual at time t (t=1, 2), and r is the interest rate.  We assume that the individual does not 
hold any assets at the beginning of the first period.   First, if the borrowing rate is the same as 
the deposit rate, and if the individual can borrow freely at the current interest rate, then the 
individual’s budget constraint is the straight line AD 
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individual chooses the point E （C1 *, C2*）, where an indifference curve is tangent to the budget 
constraint.  In this case, the individual borrows (C1 – y1) because the consumption level in the 
first period is higher than the income level in the first period.   
Next, let us consider the case in which the borrowing rate is higher than the deposit rate, 
which is a type of borrowing constraint.  In this case, the budget constraint of the individual is 
represented by the kinked line AFD (kink at F): to the left of C1 = y1, the budget constraint is the 
line segment AF 
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CC .  The individual maximizes her utility subject 
to this budget constraint.2  As Figure 1 is drawn, the individual attains maximum utility (U2) at F
（y1, y2） (the kink point).  In this case, the individual consumes all of her income in each period, 
and thus the individual’s saving is zero.  Thus, the presence of a borrowing constraint 
characterized by a borrowing rate that exceeds the deposit rate lowers the utility level of the 
individual from U1 to U2.   
Consider the case in which the individual’s income in period 1 increases from y1 to y11.  
The budget line of an individual who is not borrowing-constrained shifts from the line AD to the 
line GH, whereas that of an individual who is borrowing-constrained shifts from the kinked line 
                                                  
2 This same figure can be used to analyze the case in which the individual cannot borrow at all.  In this 
case, the budget line will also be kinked at point K, but the segment FB will be vertical. 
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AFB to the kinked line GKI.  The former attains maximum utility (U3) at J (C11, C21), whereas 
the latter attains maximum utility (U4) at K (y11, y2).  K indicates that the consumption level of 
the individual who is borrowing constrained is y11, which implies, as before, that she consumes all 
of her income in each period and thus that she increases her first-period consumption by the full 
amount of the increase in her first-period income.  Thus, changes in the individual’s 
consumption do not coincide with changes in her income in the former case (unconstrained 
individuals) whereas they do coincide with changes in her income in the latter case 
(borrowing-constrained individuals).3 
 
2. 2 Previous Research 
In this subsection, we survey the previous literature on the relationship between borrowing 
constraints and household consumption.  A large number of detailed studies have been 
conducted on this topic using data for countries other than Japan (for example, Hayashi (1985), 
Zeldes (1989), Jappelli (1990), Runkle (1991), Jappelli, et al. (1998), and Kang and Sawada 
(2005); see Hayashi (1987) for a survey). 
In one of the most seminal studies of whether borrowing constraints are present, Zeldes 
(1989) tests the permanent income hypothesis against the alternative hypothesis that consumers 
optimize subject to a well-specified sequence of liquidity constraints using data from the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).  He splits the sample into two groups on the basis of the 
ratio of non-housing wealth to income on the grounds that observations with low ratios are likely 
to be borrowing-constrained, whereas those with high ratios are unlikely to be 
borrowing-constrained.  He finds that the results are generally, but not completely, supportive of 
                                                  
3 If the magnitude of the increase in income is large, the budget constraint might shift from the kinked line 
AFD to the straight line GH (rather than the kinked line GKI).  In this case, the individual becomes 
unconstrained.     
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the view that liquidity constraints have an important influence on people’s consumption.  
However, as Jappelli (1990) points out, the main limitation of Zeldes (1989) and other previous 
studies is that borrowing-constrained consumers are not observable directly and have to be 
identified via indirect evidence--for example, on the basis of the ratio of non-housing wealth to 
income.  By contrast, the 1983 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), which Jappelli (1990) uses 
in his analysis, provides direct information on borrowing constraints (i.e., information on whether 
households’ requests for credit have been rejected by financial intermediaries), and thus these data 
can be used to analyze the impact of credit market imperfections and personal characteristics on 
borrowing constraints.  Jappelli (1990) finds that about 19.0 percent of households are rationed 
in the credit market and also finds that younger families with low levels of wealth and saving are 
more likely to be borrowing-constrained.   Jappelli (1990) cannot analyze the relationship 
between borrowing constraints and household consumption behavior because the SCF does not 
collect information on people’s consumption, but Jappelli et al. (1998) link the SCF and PSID 
data and test for the presence of borrowing constraints using the following two-step procedure: 
first, they use the direct information on borrowing constraints from the SCF to analyze the 
determinants of the probability of being borrowing-constrained.  Second, they estimate a 
switching regression model of the Euler equation combining data from the SCF and PSID and 
using a two-sample instrumental-variables technique.  They find that the excess sensitivity of 
consumption associated with the possibility of being borrowing-constrained is stronger in the case 
of their methodology than in the case of the sample splitting approach.  Kang and Sawada 
(2005) examine how the credit crunch in Korea affected households’ welfare in 1997 and 1998 
using a switching regression approach and data from the Korean Household Panel Survey and 
find that the standard consumption Euler equation, a necessary condition of the life-cycle 
permanent income hypothesis, does not hold because of binding credit constraints.  
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Many studies have been conducted of whether the presence of borrowing constraints 
affects household consumption in Japan as well (for example, Ogawa (1990), Shintani (1994), 
Kohara and Horioka (1998, 2001), and Sawada et al. (2004)), but most of these studies analyze 
the relationship between borrowing constraints and the level of consumption rather than the 
change therein.  For example, Shintani (1994) analyzes whether the presence of borrowing 
constraints affects household consumption using the 1989 and 1990 data from the “Nikkei-Needs 
RADAR Survey on Financial Behavior (RADAR),” conducted by the Data Bank Bureau of 
Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc., and finds that a significant fraction of households are 
borrowing-constrained and that, if borrowing constraints were to be lifted, aggregate consumption 
would increase 7% in 1989 and 5% in 1990.  Kohara and Horioka (1998) use 1993-97 data from 
the “Japanese Panel Survey of Consumers (JPSC),” conducted by the Institute for Household 
Economy, which collects direct information on borrowing constraints (the same question as in the 
SCF) and find that eight percent of households are borrowing-constrained.  They also estimate 
the consumption function of borrowing-constrained households using a sample selection model 
and find that the income of borrowing-constrained households has little impact on their 
consumption.  Kohara and Horioka (2001) and Sawada et al. (2004) are the only studies that 
analyze the relationship between borrowing constraints and changes in the household’s 
consumption.  Kohara and Horioka (2001) analyze data from the JPSC and find that eight 
percent of households are borrowing-constrained and that borrowing constraints do not explain 
why the Euler equation does not hold.  Sawada et al. (2004) estimate the augmented Euler 
equation using data from the JPSC and Amemiya’s (1985) Type 5 Tobit model and find that their 
results reject the standard consumption Euler equation, a necessary condition of the life-cycle 
permanent income hypothesis.  They also find using data for the 1993-99 period that the credit 
crunch became especially serious after 1997. 
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3. Data 
3.1 The Data Source 
In this subsection, we describe the data source we use in our analysis.  We use micro data 
from the 1994 “Public Opinion Survey on Household Savings and Consumption (POSSC) (in 
Japanese, Chochiku to Shouhi ni kansuru Yoron Chousa)” which was conducted by the Central 
Council for Savings Information (currently called the Central Council for Financial Services 
Information).  This survey has been conducted once a year since 1953 and collects various 
information on respondents’ behavior--for example, their income, consumption, saving, portfolio 
choice, lifetime planning, the extent of their knowledge about the financial environment, etc.  In 
the 1994 survey, a stratified two-stage random sample of 6,000 households with at least two 
members was surveyed using the drop-off, pick-up method, resulting in 4,225 responses (a 
response rate of 70.4%). 
 There are at least three advantages to using these data in our analysis.  First, we can use 
three indicators to identify borrowing-constrained households, some of which are unique to our 
data source (see the introduction for more details).  Second, this survey collects information not 
only on the levels of various variables (for example, living expenses, saving, and annual income) 
but also on the change therein.  Thus, we can use the data from this survey as panel data even 
though the survey is a cross section survey.  Third, the data we use in our analysis contains 
various information on loans--for example, new loans per year, loan repayments per year (flow 
data), and the total amount of outstanding loans (stock data).  In particular, information is 
available on outstanding loans from each type of borrower (government housing loan financial 
institutions, other financial institutions (banks, cooperative banks (in Japanese, Shinkin and 
Shinkumi), industrial banks, agricultural and fishery banks, post offices, insurance companies, and 
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housing loan financial institutions), sales companies and credit card companies, money lender 
companies (consumer credit companies (in Japanese, Sarakin) and pawnshops), employers, and 
relatives and acquaintances, six types of borrowers in total) and on outstanding loans by 
borrowing motive (housing loans, unspecified loans (in Japanese, free loans), and educational 
loans, three motives in total).  We use data from the 1994 survey because it is the most recent 
survey to collect information on the usage of credit cards, which is needed for one of the methods 
we use to identify borrowing-constrained households.  We dropped all observations for which all 
of the necessary information is not available, which reduced the number of observations from 
4,225 to 1,777. 
 
3.2 Three indicators for the presence of borrowing constraints  
The POSSC collects information on three indicators that can be used to identify  
borrowing-constrained households, and in this subsection we discuss these indicators.  One 
question the POSSC asks is the following: 
1. What complaints the respondent has about the loan screening procedures of financial 
institutions 
Question: Do you have any complaints about the services of financial institutions, or do 
you desire any improvements in these institutions? 
  
There are 13 responses to this question and two of them can be used to identify 
borrowing-constrained households: 
(a) Financial institutions should expand their low-interest personal loans. 
(b) Financial institutions should show flexibility when screening loan applications and take 
account of applicants’ credentials and projects even though their collateral is limited.  
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With respect to response (a), if financial institutions offered lower interest rates, 
respondents would presumably have taken out loans from these institutions, and they have 
presumably abandoned their plans to borrow because interest rates were too high.  Thus, we can 
say that respondents choosing response (a) are likely to be borrowing-constrained.   With 
respect to response (b), respondents have presumably had their loan applications turned down due 
to the lack of collateral,.and if financial institutions had not turned down their loan applications, 
they would presumably have taken out loans from these institutions.  Thus, we can say that 
respondents choosing response (b) are likely to be borrowing-constrained.  In our analysis, we 
assume that respondents are likely to be borrowing-constrained if they picked one or both of these 
responses.4  
 
(2) Whether or not the respondent uses credit cards   
Jappelli et al. (1998) classify as borrowing-constrained households that have neither a 
credit card nor a credit line.  They explain that even households whose loan applications were 
turned down may not be truly constrained because they can borrow at least some amount if they 
possess credit cards.  The survey we use in our analysis asks whether or not households are 
using credit cards, so we use this information as a second indicator in our analysis.   
When individuals apply for credit cards, credit card companies request extensive 
information on applicants’ occupations, incomes, loans, etc., in order to determine whether or not 
to grant the individual a credit card and in order to determine the individual’s credit limit.   
Individual can be regarded as being borrowing-constrained if their credit card applications were 
denied or if the credit limit is too low.   
The POSSC asks the following question relating to the use of credit cards: 
                                                  
4 The proportion of respondents who chose response (a) is 19%, the proportion who chose response 
(b) is 13%, and the proportion who chose both responses is 4.5 %. 
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Question: Is your household using credit cards? 
(a) Yes, we are using credit cards. 
(b) No, we are not using credit cards. 
In our analysis, we assume that respondents are likely to be borrowing-constrained if they 
choose response (b).5  
 
(3) Zeldes’ (1989) indicator -- the ratio of non-housing wealth to monthly income 
Zeldes (1989) splits his sample into two groups on the basis of the ratio of wealth to 
monthly income.  In particular, in method (i), he assumes that households whose estimated 
non-housing wealth is less than two months’ worth of income are likely to be 
borrowing-constrained, whereas all other households are unlikely to be borrowing-constrained; in 
method (ii), he assumes that households whose saving is zero or whose estimated non-housing 
wealth is zero are likely to be borrowing-constrained, whereas those whose estimated 
non-housing wealth is at least six months’ worth of income are unlikely to be 
borrowing-constrained; and in method (iii), he assumes that households whose estimated total 
wealth (including housing equity) is less than two months’ worth of income are likely to be 
borrowing-constrained, whereas all other households are unlikely to be borrowing-constrained.  
Since Zeldes seems to favor method (i) and devotes most of his discussion to it, we also use this 
indicator.  Our detailed calculation method is as follows: first, we calculate non-housing wealth 
as the sum of bank deposits and postal savings, financial trusts, loan trusts, equities, bonds, 
investment trusts, property formation saving, and other financial products (not including life 
insurance, individual pensions, and accident insurance).  Second, since there is no information 
on the amount of monthly income in the survey we use, we calculate monthly income by dividing 
                                                  
5 In the survey from which this question is taken, households that have credit cards but do not use 
them answer (b) to this question. 
 12
yearly income by 12.6 
 
4. Descriptive Statistics 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
In this subsection, we present the main descriptive statistics for all households and for 
households that are likely to be borrowing-constrained.  We discuss our results for each of the 
three indicators we use to identify borrowing-constrained households (see the introduction and 
section 3). 
First, we compare the descriptive statistics for the subsample of households that have 
complaints about the loan screening procedures of financial institutions (hereafter abbreviated as 
“households that have complaints”) (the first indicator) with those for all households.  The 
proportion of respondents who have complaints is 27.7% (493/1777), and two interesting patterns 
emerge: first, the average age of the household head is 46.8 in the case of households that have 
complaints, which is about three years younger than that of all households.  Second, households 
that have complaints have more loans than all households.  For example, in the case of 
households that have complaints, the proportion of households that have loans outstanding is 
60.2%, which is about 16 percentage points higher than in the case of all households.  Moreover, 
the average amount of new loans per year is about 540,000 yen in the case of households that 
                                                  
6 We also tried other indicators that are combinations of these three indicators (for example, (a) 
households that have complaints about the loan screening procedures of financial institutions and  are 
not using credit cards (13.5% (239 out of 1777 observations)), or (b) households that have complaints 
and households whose non-housing wealth is less than two months’ worth of income (6.5% (116 out of 
1777 observations)), etc.  We do not present the results here because the characteristics of households 
that are likely to be borrowing-constrained differ depending on which of the three indicators we use 
(in particular, the characteristics of non-credit card users are very different from those of households 
who are likely to be borrowing-constrained according to the other two criteria) (see sections 4 and 5 
for details).  For example, the characteristics of households that are likely to be 
borrowing-constrained according to indicator (b) are similar to those of households that have 
complaints, whereas those of households that are borrowing-constrained according to indicator (a) 
escape characterization.. 
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have complaints, which is about 200,000 yen (60%) higher than in the case of all households; the 
average amount of loan repayments per year is 710,000 yen in the case of households that have 
complaints, which is about 200,000 yen (39%) higher than in the case of all households; and the 
total amount of outstanding loans is 6.4 million yen in the case of households that have 
complaints, which is about 2.1 million yen (50%) higher than in the case of all households.  
Furthermore, the average amounts of loans from each type of borrower are almost always higher 
in the case of households that have complaints than in the case of all households (except in the 
case of loans from relatives and acquaintances).  A closer look at the results by type of borrower 
show that the average amount of loans from government housing loan financial institutions hardly 
differs at all according to whether or not households have complaints, whereas the average 
amounts of loans from sales companies and credit card companies and money lender companies 
are much higher in the case of households that have complaints than in the case of all households: 
for example, the average amount of loans from sales companies and credit card companies is two 
times higher and the average amount of loans from money lender companies is three times higher 
in the case of households that have complaints than in the case of all households.  These findings 
suggest that households that have complaints have more loans, especially unspecified loans, than 
all households, suggesting that these households have complaints about the loan screening 
procedures of financial institutions because they already have considerable outstanding loans and 
hence are unable to borrow more from financial intermediaries.   
Second, we compare the descriptive statistics for households that are not using credit 
cards (hereafter referred to as “non-credit card users”) (the second indicator) with those for all 
households.  The proportion of non-credit card users is 57.8% (1027/1777), and the 
characteristics of non-credit card users are very different from those of households that have 
complaints.   First, non-credit card users have fewer loans than all households, whereas 
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households that have complaints have more loans than all households.  For example, in the case 
of non-credit card users, the proportion of households that have loans outstanding is 37%, the 
average amount of new loans per year is about 310,000 yen, and the average amount of loan 
repayments per year is about 410,000 yen, and all of these amounts are much lower than both the 
case of households that have complaints and the case of all households.  On the other hand, the 
average amount of loans from relatives and acquaintances is 20,000 yen (31%) higher in the case 
of households that are not using credit cards than in the case of all households, which suggests the 
possibility that these households have no other choice but to borrow money from relatives and 
acquaintances because they are unable to borrow from financial institutions. 
Finally, I compare the descriptive statistics of households whose non-housing wealth is 
less than two months’ worth of income (hereafter abbreviated as “low-ratio households”) with 
those of all households.7  The proportion of low-ratio households is 15% (267/1777), suggesting 
that these households are much fewer in Japan compared to the U.S.8  The average yearly 
income of low-ratio households is 5.8 million yen, which is almost the same as that of all 
households, whereas the average non-housing wealth of low-ratio households is 0.34 million yen, 
which is far lower than in the case of all households.  The characteristics of low-ratio households 
are similar to those of households that have complaints.  For example, in the case of low-ratio 
households, the average amount of new loans per year is about 690,000 yen, the average amount 
of loan repayments per year is about 760,000 yen, and the total amount of outstanding loans is 
about 6.7 million yen, and all of these amounts are the highest of any category.   In addition, 
                                                  
7 We also tried dividing the sample according to whether or not households’ non-housing wealth is 
less than three, four, and six months’ worth of income because households’ non-housing wealth is 
much higher in Japan than it is in the U.S., but we do not present the results here because they were 
not significantly different from the results based on two months’ worth of income.  The proportion of 
households whose non-housing wealth is less than three, four, and six months’ worth of income is 
20.3% (361/1777), 26.2% (467/1777), and 36.2% (644/1777), respectively. 
8 Zeldes (1989) finds that the proportion of low-ratio households is 67% using data from the PSID, 
and Jappelli et al. (1998) find that the proportion thereof is 62.1% using data from the SCF.  
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loans from sales companies and credit card companies and loans from money lender companies 
are much higher in the case of low-ratio households than in the case of all households.   
Thus, we find that the characteristics of households that are likely to be 
borrowing-constrained differ depending on which of the three indicators we use. 
 
4.2 The relationship between consumption changes and income changes--discussion using 
cross-tabulations 
In this subsection, we discuss the relationship between consumption changes and income 
changes using cross-tabulations from the data source we use in our analysis.  As we discussed in 
the introduction and section 3, the data source we use in our analysis collects information on 
changes in a household’s income and consumption even though the survey is a cross-section 
survey.  The survey asks for disposable household income (after-tax household income) in the 
previous year and in the year before that, whereas the question about the change in a household’s 
consumption is as follows:  
Question: Did you change your consumption expenditure last year compared to the year 
before last?   
The answers are as follows:  
(a) We increased our consumption expenditure. 
(b) We did not change our consumption expenditure. 
(c) We reduced our consumption expenditure.   
We divide the sample into the following four groups using these questions: (1) the case in 
which there were changes in both income and consumption and the direction of the change 
therein was the same: we consider households in this group to be more likely to be 
borrowing-constrained; (2) the case in which there is a change in the household’s income but no 
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change in its consumption: in this case, changes in the household’s consumption do not depend 
on changes in its current income, and thus households in this group are behaving in accordance 
with the life cycle-permanent income hypothesis (LC/PIH): (3) the case in which there is no 
change in either consumption or income: households in this group might either be 
borrowing-constrained or behave in accordance with the LC/PIH; (4) all other cases--for example, 
the case in which there are changes in both income and consumption but the direction of the 
changes therein is opposite: households in this group are behaving irrationally.  
As can be seen from Table 2-1, the proportion of those in the first group is 26.79% 
(4.90%+21.89%), that of those in the second group is 24.87% (7.37%+17.50%), that of those in 
the third group is 17.56%, and that of those in the fourth group is 30.79% 
(4.56%+4.73%+7.43%+14.07%). 
Let us look first at households that have complaints (Table 2-2).  40.5% of these 
households are in the first group, and this figure is 13.7 percentage points higher than in the case 
of all households, whereas 22.9% of households that have complaints are in the second group, 
which is 2.0 percentage points lower than in the case of all households, suggesting that 
households that have complaints are more likely to be borrowing-constrained and less likely to be 
behaving in accordance with the LC/PIH.  This suggests that this indicator might be appropriate. 
Let us look next at non-credit card users (Table 2-3).   24.7% of these households are in 
the first group, and 25.3% are in the second group.  These figures are roughly the same as the 
figures for all households, which suggest that this indicator is not a very appropriate one.  
Lastly, let us look at households whose non-housing wealth is less than two months’ worth 
of income (Table 2-4).  31.5% of these households are in the first group is, which is 4.7 
percentage points higher than in the case of all households, whereas 15.0% are in the second 
group, which is 9.9 percentage points lower than in the case of all households.  Thus, the 
 17
relationship between consumption changes and income changes of low-ratio households is similar 
to that of households that have complaints, suggesting that this indicator might also be 
appropriate. 
Thus, we find using cross-tabluations that at least two of three indicators appear to be 
appropriate.  We conduct a more rigorous econometric analysis in the next section. 
 
5. The Estimation Model 
In this section, we discuss the estimation model we used in our analysis 
 
5.1 What characteristics do borrowing-constrained households have? 
We use the following estimation model to test what characteristics borrowing-constrained 
households have.  
  
                                           otherwise  0
              )1(                                                                                 0  if  1 *
15141312
11109876
54321
*
=
>=
+′=++×+×+×+
×+××+××+×+×+×+
××+×+×+×+×=
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BRWCONSBRWCONS
uZauaunemployedasalariedahousea
familysizeafinassetageaincomeageaagesqaageadebta
finassetincomeafinassetsqafinassetaincomesqaincomeaBRWCONS
iii
   
The dependent variable (BRWCONS) is a dummy variable that equals one for households 
that are likely to be borrowing-constrained.  We use the aforementioned three indicators to 
determine whether a household is likely to be borroing-constrained (see the introduction and 
section 3).  The explanatory variables are household disposable income (income), its square 
(incomesq), non-housing wealth (finasset), its square (finassetsq), the cross-product of income 
and non-housing wealth (income*finasset), a dummy variable for whether or not the household 
owns its own home (house), three sets of variables that are related to outstanding loans ((a) the 
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total amount of outstanding loans, (b) outstanding loans from each type of borrower (six types of 
borrowers in total) and (c) outstanding loans by borrowing motive (three motives in total)), 
demographic variables: the household head’s age (age), its square (agesq), the cross-product of 
age and income and that of age and non-housing wealth (age*income and age*finasset), the 
number of family members (familysize), a dummy variable that equals one for households whose 
head is a salaried worker and zero for households whose head is a self-employed worker or not 
working (salaried), and a dummy variable that equals one for households whose head is 
unemployed and zero for households whose head is working or has already retired (unemployed).9   
In this analysis, the estimation method we use is probit because the dependent variable 
BRWCONS is discrete.  
 
5.2 Do borrowing constraints have an important influence on household consumption 
behavior? 
We use the following two equations to test whether the determinants of changes in a 
household’s consumption (CDIF) differ significantly depending on whether or not it is likely to 
be borrowing-constrained:10   
Regime 1 
)12(                                              111
114131211
*
−−≥′+′=
++×+×+×=
iiii
i
uZaiffuxb
ubagesqbagebidifbCDIF
  
Regime 2 
                                                  
9 We assumed that those not working and aged 59 or under are unemployed and that those not 
working and aged 60 or older are retired. 
10 We use the conventional approach of estimating log-linearized consumption Euler equations (that is, 
we regress the change in a household’s current income on the change in its consumption) to analyze 
the relationship between borrowing constraints and consumption behavior even though some authors 
(e.g., Carroll (2001) and Ludvigson and Paxson (2001)) have cast doubt on the validity of this 
approach.       
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We use equation (1) for the criterion function that determines which of these two 
equations is applicable: 
otherwise
uZaifBRWCONS ii
  0                    
   1
=
−≥′=    (1)  
The dependent variable (CDIF) of the model is a three-outcome ordered variable that 
equals zero for households that reduced their consumption last year compared to the year before 
last, one for households that did not change their consumption last year compared to the year 
before last, and two for households that increased their consumption last year compared to the 
year before last.  If households behave in accordance with the life cycle model, changes in the 
household’s consumption from one period to the next should not depend on changes in its current 
income, so idif 






=
yearlast  beforeyear  for the income
yearlast  for the incomeln  (the rate of change of income 
from the year before last to last year) should not have any impact on CDIF.  If, however, 
households are borrowing constrained, idif should have a positive and significant effect on CDIF.  
We also include variables such as household head’s age (age) and its square (agesq) to proxy for 
changes in preferences over the life cycle.  
  We use an ordered response model with a switching regression assuming that iu is 
correlated with iu1  and iu2 .  That is, we estimate 1 b , 2 b  using the following response 
probabilities.11 
                                                  
11 ),,( ρkhΦ  is a joint cumulative bivariate normal distribution of the correlation coefficient ρ , 
cumulated over the interval ],(],( kh −∞×−∞ : 
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The conditional probabilities of equation (2-1) are:  
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Similarly, the conditional probabilities of equation (2-2) are: 
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6. Estimation Results 
6.1 What characteristics do borrowing-constrained households have?  
In this subsection, we present our estimation results concerning the characteristics of  
households that are likely to be borrowing-constrained.  We discuss our results for each of the 
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three indicators we use to identify borrowing-constrained (see the introduction and section 3). 
Let us look first at the results from estimating equation (1) using the first indicator (Table 
3-(1), columns (a), (b), and (c)).  First, the coefficient of income (household disposable income) 
is negative and marginally significant in every case, meaning that the lower a household’s 
disposable income is, the higher is the probability of having loan applications turned down, which 
is consistent with our expectations.  The coefficient of finasset (non-housing wealth) is not 
significant in any of the three cases, which is contrary to expectation, whereas the coefficient of 
house (a dummy variable for whether or not the household owns its own home), which is a proxy 
for real assets, is negative and significant in almost every case, suggesting that the higher a 
household‘s wealth is, the lower is its need for loans (the demand factor) and the lower is the 
probability of having its loan application turned down (the supply factor), which is consistent 
with our expectations.  The coefficient of age (the household head’s age) is positive and 
significant, which is contrary to expectation because borrowing constraints are more important for 
younger families due to supply side adverse selection.  In addition, we use the following three 
sets of variables that pertain to outstanding loans: (a) the total amount of outstanding loans, (b) 
outstanding loans from each type of borrower (six types of borrowers in total) and (c) outstanding 
loans by borrowing motive (three motives in total).  We would expect that the higher outstanding 
loans are, the higher is the probability of having loan applications turned down (the supply factor), 
and thus we would expect all of the coefficients of variables pertaining to outstanding loans to be 
positive.  Let us look first at the results using (a) the total amount of outstanding loans as an 
explanatory variable.  The coefficient of the total amount of outstanding loans is positive and 
significant, suggesting that the higher the total amount of outstanding loans is, the more likely it 
is that the household has complaints about the loan screening procedures of financial institutions.  
We look next at the results using (b) outstanding loans from each type of borrower as explanatory 
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variables.  The coefficient of loans from government housing loan financial institutions, loans 
from other financial institutions, loans from sales companies and credit card companies, and loans 
from money lender companies have a positive and significant effect on BRWCONS.  In addition, 
the estimated value of the marginal effects of loans from sales companies and credit card 
companies and that of loans from money lender companies are 0.81 and 4.78, respectively, 
meaning that if loans from these institutions increase by 100,000 yen, the probability of being 
borrowing- constrained increases by 0.8% and 4.9%, respectively.  Looking lastly at the results 
using (c) outstanding loans by borrowing motive as explanatory variables, we find that not only 
do all of the borrowing motives have positive and significant effects on BRWCONS but that the 
effect of the total amount of unspecified loans thereon is much larger than that of the total amount 
of housing loans. 
Looking next at the results from estimating equation (1) using the second indicator 
(Table 3-(2), columns (a), (b), and (c)), we find that the coefficient of income (household 
disposable income) is negative and significant, as expected, whereas the coefficient of finasset is 
positive and significant, contrary to expectation.  In addition, although the coefficients of the 
amount of outstanding loans from financial institutions and from sales companies and credit card 
companies are negative and significant, contrary to expectation, we would like to focus on the 
coefficient of loans from relatives and acquaintances, which is positive and significant.  This 
result might reflect the fact that non-credit card users may have abandoned their plans to borrow 
from sales companies and credit card companies and thus that they might have no other choice 
but to borrow from relatives and acquaintances.   
Finally, we look at the results from estimating equation (1) using the third indicator 
(Table 3-(3), columns (a), (b), and (c)) and find that the results are similar to the results using the 
first indicator.  For example, almost all of the coefficients of variable pertaining to outstanding 
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loans are positive and significant, suggesting that low-ratio households have a higher amount of 
loans than other households. 
Thus, the characteristics of households that are likely to be borrowing-constrained differ 
depending on which of the three indicators we use.  That is, the characteristics of households 
that have complaints and that of low-ratio households have a higher amount of outstanding loans, 
especially “unspecific” loans, than all households, whereas non-credit card users have a lower 
amount of outstanding loans than all households except that they borrow more from relatives and 
acquaintances.   
Finally, our results show that we need to exercise caution when selecting indicators for 
identifying borrowing-constrained households because some indicators are better than others, 
with whether or not households are using credit cards being the most problematic.  Households 
that are not using credit cards include not only households whose credit card applications were 
denied but also those who did not apply for credit cards even though their applications would 
have been approved and those who own but do not use credit cards because they dislike owning 
and/or using them.12  In addition, elderly households might have a lower probability of not using 
credit cards than younger households because the former might not be accustomed to using them.  
This might be the reason why the average age of the household head is 52 years old in the case of 
non-credit card users, which is the highest age of any category.  Similarly, households living in 
rural areas might have a higher probability of not using credit cards than households living in 
urban areas because credit cards are less widely accepted in rural areas than in urban areas. 
In addition, let us look at Figures 2-1 and 2-2.  These figures plot the probability of being 
borrowing-constrained against current income keeping all other variables constant at their sample 
                                                  
12 We think that the reason why the POSSC has not asked the question about whether or not 
households are using credit cards since the 1995 survey is that almost all Japanese had credit cards by 
then.   
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mean values (Jappelli (1990) uses the same method on U.S. data).  Looking first at Figure 2-1, 
which is based on the first indicator (whether or not households have complaints), the probability 
of being borrowing constrained is a decreasing function of current income, which is consistent 
with the presence of borrowing constraints (and also consistent with Jappelli’s (1990) findings 
based on U.S. data), whereas in Figure 2-2, which is based on the second indicator (whether or 
not households are using credit cards), the impact of current income on the probability of being 
borrowing constrained is not clear, suggesting that whether or not households are using credit 
cards is more problematic than the other two indicators.  The descriptive statistics also support 
these results.     
 
 
6.2 Do borrowing constraints have an important influence on household consumption 
behavior? 
In this subsection, we examine whether the determinants of changes in a household’s 
consumption differ significantly depending on whether or not it is likely to be 
borrowing-constrained. 
Table 4, (1-1) and (1-2) presents the results from estimating equations (2)-(1) and (2)-(2) 
using the first indicator (whether or not households have complaints about the loan screening 
procedures of financial institutions) in the first step.  Looking at the impact of idif (the change in 
the household’s income) on CDIF (the change in the household’s consumption), the coefficient of 
idif is positive and significant at the 10% level only in the case of households that are likely to be 
borrowing-constrained and is insignificant in the case of households that are unlikely to be 
borrowing-constrained.   The derivatives of the three probabilities with respect to the change in 
income are as follows:  
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This implies that, if the change in the household’s income increases by 1 percentage point, the 
probability of the household decreasing its consumption decreases by 4.5 percentage points, the 
probability of the household not changing its consumption increases by 2.3 percentage point, and 
the probability of the household increasing its consumption increases by 6.8 percentage points.  
  We look next at the results using the second indicator (whether or not households are 
using credit cards) in the first step and again find that the coefficient of idif is positive and 
significant only in the case of households that are likely to be borrowing-constrained and is not 
significant in the case of households that are unlikely to be borrowing-constrained.  The 
derivatives of the three probabilities with respect to the change in income are as follows: 
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meaning that, for example, if the change in the household’s income increases by 1 percentage 
point, the probability of the household decreasing its consumption decreases by 4.7 percentage 
points, which is consistent with the presence of borrowing constraints. 
 Finally, we look at the results using the third indicator (whether or not households’ 
non-housing wealth is less than two months’ worth of income) in the first step.  We found that 
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changes in the household’s income do not have any impact on changes in its consumption in the 
case of households that are unlikely to be borrowing-constrained, as expected, whereas changes in 
the household’s income do not have any impact on changes in its consumption in the case of 
households that are likely to be borrowing constrained either, which is contrary to expectation.  
 To summarize our findings in this section, we find evidence that changes in the current 
income of households that are likely to be borrowing-constrained have a positive and significant 
impact on changes in their consumption (except in the case of low-ratio households), whereas 
changes in the income of households that are unlikely to be borrowing-constrained do not have 
any impact on changes in their consumption, suggesting that borrowing constraints have an 
important influence on household consumption behavior.13  
 
7. Conclusion 
  In this paper, we examined what characteristics borrowing-constrained households have 
and whether borrowing constraints have an important influence on household consumption 
behavior using Japanese micro data from the 1994 “Public Opinion Survey on Household Savings 
and Consumption (POSSC).  We identified borrowing-constrained households using three 
indicators, the data for some of which are unique to our data source.  We obtained the following 
results: first, households that have complaints about the loan screening procedures of financial 
institutions and those whose non-housing wealth is less than two months’ worth of income have a 
                                                  
13 We also tried conducting a similar analysis using data from the 2000 POSSC and found that the 
results were not significantly different from the results using the 1994 POSSC.  The reason why we 
used the 1994 POSSC is as follows: first, as we stated earlier, the POSSC has not asked the question 
about whether or not households are using credit cards since the 1995 survey.  Second, the POSSC 
has asked only a question about the direction of change in a household’s income (which is similar to 
the question about the change in a household’s consumption in the 1994 POSSC) since the 1995 
survey.  Third, the POSSC has not asked the question about the direction of changes in a household’s 
consumption and income and has asked only a question about the direction of change in a household’s 
saving since 2001.  
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higher amount of outstanding loans, especially “unspecific” loans, than all households.  Second, 
households that are not using credit cards have a smaller amount of outstanding loans than other 
households except that they borrow more from their relatives and acquaintances.  Thus, the 
characteristics of borrowing-constrained households differ greatly depending on which indicator 
we use, and whether or not households have complaints about the loan screening procedures of 
financial institutions and whether or not households’ non-housing wealth is less than two months’ 
worth of income appear to be far better indicators than whether or not households are using credit 
cards.   
Third, we examined whether changes in the household’s consumption differ significantly 
by whether or not it is borrowing-constrained and found that changes in the current income of 
households that are likely to be borrowing-constrained have a positive and significant impact on 
changes in their consumption in almost all cases, whereas changes in the current income of 
households that are unlikely to be borrowing-constrained do not have a significant impact on 
changes in their consumption in any case.  These results suggest that borrowing constraints have 
an important influence on household consumption behavior and that the presence of borrowing 
constraints is one explanation for why the life cycle-permanent income hypothesis does not hold 
in the real world. 
 We turn finally to directions for further research.  First, the data source we used in our 
analysis also collects information on changes in each household’s saving so we would also like to 
examine whether changes in the household’s current income have an impact on changes in its 
saving.  Second, Kohara and Horioka (1998, 2001) point out that one of the most appropriate 
proxies for borrowing constraints is the household head’s educational attainment, but the data 
source we use does not collect direct information thereon.  We tried using indirect information 
on educational attainment in order to analyze the relationship between borrowing constraints and 
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the household head’s educational attainment, but we do not present the results here because 
almost all of the coefficients were not significantly different from zero.   
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Figure 1. A Theoretical Analysis of the Impact of Borrowing Constraints on Consumption 
Behavior. 
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Figure 2-1. The Probability of Being Borrowing-Constrained using the First Indicator. 
(Borrowing-constrained households are households that have complaints about the loan 
screening procedures of financial institutions.)  
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Figure 2-2. The Probability of Being Borrowing-Constrained using the Second Indicator. 
(Borrowing-constrained households are households that are not using credit cards.)  
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Variable
All Households
(1777)
(1) Households
that have
complaints about
the loan screening
procedures of
financial
institutions （493）
(2) Households
that are not using
credit cards
（1027）
(3) Households
whose non-
housing wealth is
l;ess than two
months’ worth of
income（267）
Household head's age 49.59 46.75 51.80 45.97
(12.22) (10.73) (12.37) (11.34)
Family size 3.60 3.85 3.54 3.07
(1.30) (1.30) (1.36) (2.37)
Income in the previous year 579.60 580.34 539.17 578.75
(millions of yen) (315.80) (287.47) (296.95) (315.84)
Income in the year before last 5.796 5.844 5.401 5.682
(3.173) (2.826) (2.849) (3.131)
Financial assets 7.286 4.865 6.754 0.335
(9.846) (7.260) (9.755) (0.394)
New loans per year 0.332 0.538 0.310 0.695
(2.450) (3.140) (2.403) (4.135)
Repayment of outstanding loans
per year 0.515 0.705 0.407 0.764
(1.262) (1.194) (1.273) (1.260)
Consumption expenditure 4.745 4.781 4.495 4.643
(2.707) (2.728) (2.542) (2.493)
Total outstanding loans 4.245 6.362 3.389 6.701
(8.699) (10.962) (7.277) (11.612)
 Borrowing from government
housing loan finance institutions 2.189 2.888 1.817 3.228
(5.578) (6.297) (4.739) (7.187)
 Borrowing from financial
institutions (banks, post offices,
etc. ) 1.515 2.802 1.103 2.590
(5.676) (8.161) (4.307) (8.520)
Borrowing from sales
companies and credit card
companies 0.086 0.166 0.046 0.223
(0.409) (0.582) (0.314) (0.683)
Borrowing from money lender
companies 0.006 0.018 0.003 0.010
(0.104) (0.195) (0.081) (0.102)
Borrowing from one's employer 0.359 0.408 0.295 0.512
(2.221) (1.942) (2.229) (2.287)
Borrowing from relatives and
acquaintances 0.068 0.064 0.089 0.118
(0.824) (0.523) (0.941) (1.111)
Housing loans 3.779 5.530 3.053 5.858
(8.401) (10.444) (7.088) (11.360)
Unspecified loans 0.350 0.660 0.256 0.622
(1.746) (2.670) (1.562) (2.642)
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (Means and Standard Deviations)
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The ratio of households that are
in debt 44.51 60.24 36.51 62.17
Homeownership ratio 65.79 62.27 68.45 59.18
Salaried household ratio 59.09 59.92 53.65 62.17
Unemployment ratio (those aged
under 60) 0.96 0.41 1.36 0.37
Source: The 1994 Public Opinion Survey on Household Savings and Consumption
 (in Japanese, Chochiku to Shouhi ni kansuru Yoron Chousa).
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.  
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Table 2:　Changes in consumption and income
(2-1) Full sample Income
Consumption Decreased No change Increased Total
Decreased 87 81 84 252
(4.90) (4.56) (4.73) (14.18)
No change 131 312 311 754
(7.37) (17.56) (17.50) (42.43)
Increased 132 250 389 771
(7.43) (14.07) (21.89) (43.39)
Total 350 643 784 1,777
(19.70) (36.18) (44.12) (100.00)
(2-2) Households that
have complaints about
the loan screening
procedures of financial
institutions （493）
income
Consumption Decreased No change Increased Total
Decreased 33 15 22 70
(13.36) (6.07) (8.91) (28.34)
No change 35 63 78 176
(7.10) (12.78) (15.82) (35.70)
Increased 48 65 134 247
(9.74) (13.18) (27.18) (50.10)
Total 116 143 234 493
(23.53) (29.01) (47.46) (100.00)
(2-3) Households that
are not using credit
cards （1,027）
Income
Consumption Decreased No change Increased Total
Decreased 52 42 47 141
(5.06) (4.09) (4.58) (13.73)
No change 79 210 181 470
(7.69) (20.45) (17.62) (45.76)
Increased 76 138 202 416
(7.40) (13.44) (19.67) (40.51)
Total 207 390 430 1027
(20.16) (37.97) (41.87) (100.00)
(2-4) Households
whose non-housing
wealth is less than two
months' worth of
income（267）
Income
Consumption Decreased No change Increased Total
Decreased 14 13 16 43
(5.24) (4.87) (5.99) (16.10)
No change 11 51 29 91
(4.12) (19.10) (10.86) (34.08)
Increased 22 41 70 133
(8.24) (15.36) (26.22) (49.81)
Total 47 105 115 267
(17.60) (39.33) (43.07) (100.00)
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Table 3: What Characteristics Do Borrowing-Constrained Households Have?  
(Estimated marginal effects from probit)
Dependent Variable(1)
Households
that have
complaints
about the loan
screening
procedures of
financial
institutions
(2)
Households
that are not
using credit
cards（1027）
(10 million yen) a b c a b
Income -0.3493 * -0.3224 -0.3293 -0.6183 *** -0.6737 ***
(0.2070) (0.2105) (0.2063) (0.2225) (0.2263)
Incomesq -0.0697 -0.0713 -0.0585 0.1286 *** 0.1366 ***
(0.0611) (0.0618) (0.0577) (0.0420) (0.0426)
Finasset -0.0805 -0.0772 -0.0850 0.1635 ** 0.1502 *
(0.0790) (0.0796) (0.0786) (0.0814) (0.0820)
Finassetsq 0.0161 *** 0.0149 * 0.0152 ** -0.0080 * -0.0062
(0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0059) (0.0070) (0.0072)
Income*Finasset -0.0175 -0.0115 -0.0168 -0.0621 * -0.0650 *
(0.0347) (0.0352) (0.0346) (0.0353) (0.0359)
Borrowing 0.0699 ** -0.0253
(0.013) (0.016)
from government housing loan 0.0397 ** -0.0165
(0.020) (0.0235)
from financial institutions 0.1040 *** -0.0399 *
(0.0206) (0.0238)
from sales companies and
credit card companies 0.8122 *** -1.3311 ***
(0.2606) (0.3373)
from money lender companies 4.7851 * -1.5415
(2.9282) (1.2227)
from one's employer 0.0287 0.0091
(0.0512) (0.0536)
acquaintances -0.0858 0.3221 *
(0.1460) (0.1709)
Housing loans 0.0607 ***
(0.014)
Unspecified loans 0.2382 ***
(0.0676)
Age 0.0131 * 0.0132 * 0.0139 * 0.0055 0.0071
(0.0071) (0.0072) (0.0072) (0.0080) (0.0080)  
Agesq -0.0002 *** -0.0002 *** -0.0002 *** 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Age*Income 0.0088 ** 0.0080 ** 0.0081 ** 0.0030 0.0038
(0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0040) (0.0043) (0.0044)
Age*Finasset -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0009 -0.0009
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0014)
Family size 0.0193 ** 0.0185 ** 0.0185 ** 0.0209 ** 0.0228 **
(0.0089) (0.0090) (0.0089) (0.0104) (0.0105)
Homeownership dummy+ -0.0638 ** -0.0447 -0.0604 ** 0.0095 -0.0051
(0.0278) (0.0281) (0.0279) (0.0306) (0.0312)
Salaried worker household
dummy+
-0.0297 -0.0173 -0.0272 -0.0412 -0.0548 **
(0.0238) (0.0240) (0.0238) (0.0266) (0.0269)
Unemployment dummy+ (those
aged under 60)
-0.1303 -0.1305 -0.1321 0.0877 0.0901
(0.0871) (0.0874) (0.0863) (0.1332) (0.1346)
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(3) Households whose
non-housing wealth is
less than two months'
worth of income
（267）
c a b c
-0.6323 ***
(0.2230)
0.1259 ***
(0.0421)
0.1668 **
(0.0817)
-0.0074
(0.0071)
-0.0634 *
(0.0354)
0.0410 ***
(0.0092)
0.0366 **
(0.0143)
0.0379 ***
(0.0130)
0.7212 ***
(0.1689)
0.1399
(0.6760)
0.0341
(0.0335)
0.0602
(0.0865)
-0.0174 0.0375 ***
(0.016) (0.0096)
-0.1326 * 0.0923 **
(0.0676) (0.0419)
0.0051 -0.0028 -0.0036 -0.0026
(0.0080) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0051)
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
0.0033
(0.0043)
-0.0010
(0.0014)
0.0215 ** 0.0178 *** 0.0166 ** 0.0175 **
(0.0104) (0.0068) (0.0166) (0.0068)
0.0052 -0.0416 ** -0.0316 -0.0394 *
(0.0307) (0.0217) (0.0218) (0.0217)
-0.0426 -0.0109 -0.0046 -0.0107
(0.0266) (0.0182) (0.0182) (0.0182)
0.0897 -0.0661 -0.0713 -0.0676
(0.1330) (0.0702) (0.0677) (0.0693)  
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Notes: 
*Significant at the 10% level, **significant at the 5% level, ***significant at the 1% level. 
We use three indicators to define the dependent variable, which equals one for households that are 
likely to be borrowing-constrained and zero otherwise. 
The estimated marginal effect can be derived from the height of the normal density multiplied by the 
coefficient of the explanatory variable.  
(+) The marginal effect is for a discrete change in the dummy variable from 0 to 1.
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Table 4: Borrowing Constraints and Consumption Behavior (N=1777)
(1) Whether or not households have complaints about the loan screening procedures of financial institutions
Constrained Change in consumption Mean of variable Marginal effects in the case of contrained households
lnincomedif 0.229 * -0.005 -beta*xbar -1.1932
(0.136) mu1-beta*xbar 0.7652
Age -0.019 49.591
(0.038)
Agesq 0.000 2608.515 Estimated marginal effect
(0.000) Decrease dP0/dlnincomed -0.045
Constant 1.454 No change dP1/dlnincomed -0.023
(0.898) Increase dP2/dlnincomed 0.068
Unconstrained Change in consumption
lnincomedif -0.0411
(0.0565)
Age -0.0113
(0.0205)
Agesq 0.0002
(0.0002)
Constant -0.1064
(0.5511)
mu1 1.9585 ***
(0.2561)
mu2 11.5345
rho1 0.9969
rho2 -0.9220 ***
(0.1199)  
(2) Whether or not households are using credit cards
Constrained Change in consumption Mean of variable Marginal effects in the case of constrained households
lnincomedif 0.226 ** -0.005 -beta*xbar -1.1486
(0.100) mu1-beta*xbar 1.6346
Age -0.009 49.591
(0.027) Estimated marginal effect
Agesq 0.000 2608.515 Decrease dP0/dlnincomed -0.047
(0.000) No change dP1/dlnincomed 0.023
Constant 1.398 ** Increase dP2/dlnincomed 0.024
(0.686)
Unconstrained Change in consumption
lnincomedif -0.1913
(0.1438)
Age -0.0209
(0.0411)
Agesq 0.0002
(0.0004)
Constant 0.9164
(1.2350)
mu1 2.7832
(7.4703)
mu2 20.5049
(2576.1070)
rho1 0.9991 ***
(0.0409)
rho2 -0.1165
(0.6981)
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(3) Whether or not households' non-housing wealth is less than two months' worth of income
Constrained Change in consumption Mean of variable
lnincomedif -0.163 -0.005
(0.218)
Age 0.000 49.591
(0.069)
Agesq 0.000 2608.515
(0.001)
Constant 0.496
(1.696)
Unconstrained Change in consumption
lnincomedif 0.0920
(0.0995)
Age 0.0003
(0.0256)
Agesq 0.0000
(0.0003)
Constant 0.4967
(0.9107)
mu1 22.7334
(208046.9000)
mu2 9.2475
(788.7313)
rho1 0.0654
rho2 -0.2535
(0.7860)  
